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Summary. The research paper discusses different issues of interpretation and qualification of illegal access to an information system 
(IS), taking into account international instruments and European Union legislation as well as the relevant case law of Lithuania. Analysis 
of criminal cases and legal regulation shows that such cases require an appropriate combination of the technical and legal sides of such 
criminal offences. In this context, it is also important that criminal liability for illegal access to an IS must be underpinned not only by the 
principles of technological neutrality and equivalent assessment but also must ensure respect for the ultima ratio (last resort) principle. 
It is this principle which in particular is the subject of considerable attention in the research paper in terms of over-criminalisation of 
illegal access to an IS. While solving the puzzle of technology and terminology alignment, the paper also explores the elements of illegal 
access to an IS. In the light of developments in Lithuanian case law, more emphasis is placed on the debatable infringement of security 
measures, as an element, and on possible interpretation of its content. 
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1. Introduction
Ongoing development of information technologies (IT) and electronic communications creates preconditions 
for disseminating data without any physical space limitations and for the emergence of new ways of accessing IS 
and the data held in the IS. Cyberspace, which is characterised by continuous progress-driven developments, has 
been designed to function as a place where electronic data can be processed, IS can be accessed, communication 
and participation in virtual activities can take place, etc. ‘Information technologies are common not only in 
personal relationships, business, but also in state governance, military systems (which, historically, had a strong 
impact on the development of this area), science, etc.’ (Štitilis et al, 2016: p. 197). The development of the 
cyberspace, however, goes hand in hand with inherent threats particularly in terms of the criminal offences 
committed in that space. Cybercrime is considered as one of the main challenges and threats in cyberspace 
(Tvaronavičienė, 2018), as well as one of the negative consequences of IT development (Štitilis & Klišauskas, 
2015: p. 45; Korauš et al. 2019). For example, illegal access to an IS, depending on the services provided by 
the IS, can open avenues for unlawful payment transactions (money transfers to other bank accounts, payments 
for purchases, the use of online banking to get fast credits, etc.), violations of the right to privacy, disclosure 
of commercial secrets, counterfeiting of electronic documents or data, illegal IS interference, etc. The impact 
of IT progress on the possibilities for committing criminal offences has led to qualitatively and quantitatively 
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new legal issues (Kohl, 1999: pp. 126–128) in protecting the legitimate interests of society and its individual 
members in cyberspace. 
It would not be wrong to state that the imposition of criminal liability for criminal offences against the safety of 
electronic data and information systems is influenced by international and European Union (EU) legal instruments 
aimed at fighting crimes in cyberspace. Among the most important instruments are the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (Convention) and Directive 2013/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 August 2013 on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2005/222/JHA (Directive 2013/40/EU). To bring more clarity, it should be noted that the Convention provides 
for a wider range of cybercrime than the provisions of Directive 2013/40/EU. The groups of crimes committed 
in cyberspace mentioned therein include: 1) Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems; 2) Computer-related offences; 3) Content-related offences; 4) Offences related to 
infringements of copyright and related rights. Such a distinction makes it possible to refer to all of these crimes 
as cybercrimes perceived in their broadest sense. Meanwhile, Directive 2013/40/EU provides a narrower legal 
framework for defining a cybercrime in this respect: it only contains criminal offenses that directly infringe 
the security of electronic data and information systems and which can be considered as cybercrime perceived 
in the narrow sense. These differences indicate that the offenses set forth in Directive 2013/40/EU only partly 
match the offences mentioned in the Convention and, in general terms, are consistent with offences against the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems (Chapter II, Section 1, Title 1 of the 
Convention). 
One of the objectives of Directive 2013/40/EU is to harmonise the criminal law of the Member States of 
the EU in the area of attacks against information systems. In pursuing these goals, the Directive states that 
illegal access to information systems (Article 3), illegal system interference (Article 4), illegal data interference 
(Article 5), illegal interception (Article 6) and disposition of tools used for committing offenses (Article 7) are 
considered to be criminal offences. However, the search of the general approach to the constituent elements 
of criminal offences also involves a number of issues related to regulatory framework. For example, Directive 
2013/40/EU does not intend to impose criminal liability in the case of offences committed unintentionally (for 
example, when a person did not know that access to an IS or data is illegal) or without guilt (in the case of 
ethical system testing); when the employer’s information systems are used for employee’s personal purposes, 
which is essentially a labour dispute; when acts committed are of minor relevance, etc. These are just some 
of the problems that may be encountered in implementing the provisions of the Directive 2013/40/EU. Other 
difficulties in applying the provisions usually appear in specific criminal cases concerning cybercrime and are 
often related to the interpretation of constituent elements of criminal offences. Therefore, it is relevant not 
only to provide a sufficiently clear description of criminal offences in the criminal law, but also to formulate a 
uniform interpretation of such acts, taking account of developments in technology. 
The method selected for implementing the provisions of Convention and Directive 2013/40/EU in the national 
law will also predetermine the specifics of criminalisation of such offences, the directions of interpretation 
of the elements of corpus delicti, and, consequently, also the possibilities of incriminating the offender with 
cybercrime. The criminal offence of illegal access to an IS, which is the focus of analysis in this paper, would 
not be an exception in this regard. Creation of the legal grounds for criminal liability for illegal access to an 
IS may lead to both over-criminalisation of such acts and problems in interpreting their elements in individual 
criminal proceedings. In the light of the requirements of the ultima ratio principle, the research paper formulates 
the criteria, which would make it possible to substantiate the dangerousness of such offence so as to make a 
person criminally liable, and hence also prove its harmfulness to the values protected by criminal law. The 
overall assessment of the developing case law of Lithuanian courts in the cases of illegal access to IS has also 
revealed certain technology-related aspects of interpretation of the offence elements. From the perspective of 
criminal law, this analysis has shown that the correct interpretation of the offence elements and the balance 
between technological and legal aspects of this offence are the basis for the formation of a consistent case law, 
compatible with the principles of criminal law and open to technological developments.
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Previously the issues of cybercrime were analysed by Jonathan Clough (Clough, 2010, 2011) and Ian Walden 
(Walden, 2007). Chris Reed (Reed, 2004, 2007) also analysed the problems of criminalising and interpreting 
the acts in cyberspace. Some of the aspects related to the criminalisation of unauthorised access and the 
interpretation of the features of such offenses have been addressed by Mary W. S. Wong (Wong, 2006) and 
Maria Kaiafa-Gbandi (Kaiafa-Gbandi, 2012). Andrew Ashworth (Ashworth, 2008) raised the issue of over-
criminalisation relevant to the topic, whereas Paul Ohm (Ohm, 2010) and Bert-Jaap Koops (Koops, 2006) 
analysed the advantages and disadvantages of technology-neutral legal regulation.
This research paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a study of illegal access to an IS in the context 
of international and EU legal instruments and discusses the issue of over-criminalisation of this offence. 
It also brings forward an idea of what criteria could be applied for ascertaining the required degree of its 
dangerousness. Section 3 explores the specifics of criminalisation of illegal access to an IS in Lithuania and the 
recent changes resulting from the transposition of the provisions of Directive 2013/40/EU into the national law. 
Subsection 3.1 explores, in line with the case law developments, the criterion of ‘creating opportunities for the 
commission of other offences in the system’, which is relevant in dealing with the issue of over-criminalisation 
of illegal access to an IS. Sub-section 3.2 unfolds the content of infringement of IS security measures, as an 
offence element, and points to potential problems of interpretation of this element. Conclusions of this paper 
are provided in Section 4.
2. Criminalisation specifics of hacking and over-criminalisation issues
The ‘move’ of traditional criminal offences to cyberspace has also changed the possibilities for committing 
offences (for example, fraud, forgery, libel, offences related to child pornography, terrorism, etc.). Cyberspace 
has opened up avenues for offences that may be considered to be an exclusive result of the development of 
computer technologies (for example, illegal access to an IS, illegal system or data interference, etc.). Thus, it may 
be agreed that ‘the advent of computer technology has brought many kinds of opportunities and some of these, 
not surprisingly, are of a criminal nature’ (Bainbridge, 2004: p. 359; Benešová, Hušek, 2019). The establishment 
of criminal liability in such cases will depend on the legislator’s competence to appropriately define the elements 
of such criminal offences and on the creativity of those who apply law (the court) in linking a rule of criminal 
law with a specific deliberate cyber incident. The fact, that ‘legal regulations related to the Internet are the most 
dynamically developing legal field and should be created at the national and international level’ (Grubicka & 
Matuska, 2015: p. 194), is also important in this context. As regards cybercrime in the context of criminal law, 
it is important to note that we will inevitably have to figure out both the legal and the technological side of the 
offence when incriminating the offender with such an offence. For example, if it is presumed that the fact of 
illegal access to an IS has been ascertained in the proceedings and that access to electronic data has been gained, 
we will have to define what meaning is attributed to the IS or electronic data, what IS security measures mean 
and how they have been infringed (this problem is partly related to the implementation of the technological 
neutrality principle in formulating the rules of law (for more, see Koops, 2006; Downing, 2005: p. 705; Ohm, 
2010; Reed, 2007: p. 269). That is, however, insufficient – it is also important to find out whether criminal law 
may be applied for the qualification of such criminal offence. It is likely that it is the mutual alignment of these 
two specific aspects – legal and technological – and the implementation of the requirements deriving from the 
principles of criminal liability that can pose quite a few problems. 
As far as illegal access to an IS is concerned, resolution of the above-mentioned problems can be facilitated 
by international and EU legal acts – Convention and Directive 2013/40/EU. They set out not only minimum 
requirements for the elements of this criminal offence, the definitions of the terms but also, which is no less 
important, contain certain references to the need to consider the threat of illegal access to an IS. Article 3 of 
the Directive states that ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, when committed 
intentionally, the access without right, to the whole or to any part of an information system, is punishable as a 
criminal offence where committed by infringing a security measure, at least for cases which are not minor.’ Such 
concept of illegal access to an IS would make it possible to prosecute for such a criminal offence irrespective 
of whether the offender who has infringed the IS confidentiality has also committed other criminal offences in 
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the system. This criminal offence has also been defined in Article 2 of the Convention by providing that ‘each 
Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences 
under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer 
system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, 
with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that 
is connected to another computer system.’ It may be stated that the imposition of criminal liability for illegal 
access to an IS, as an independent offence, should be linked with the measures to be taken at an ‘early stage’ 
(Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, point 45) until no other criminal offences have been 
committed in the system. Thus, this offence is an example of punishing for a potential risk of damage as far as 
‘the possibility of damage, rather than damage itself’ is concerned (Clough, 2011: p. 161). Indeed, illegal access 
to IS ‘may give access to confidential data (including passwords, information about the targeted system) and 
secrets, to the use of the system without payment or even encourage hackers to commit more dangerous forms 
of computer-related offences, like computer-related fraud or forgery’ (Explanatory Report to the Convention 
on Cybercrime, point 44). There are numerous examples in the case law of Lithuanian courts where offenders 
were incriminated with illegal access to IS after it was identified that they had illegally logged into the online 
banking system and carried out unlawful financial transactions in the system; obtained unlawful access to 
the Facebook account of another person and sent misleading messages to other users of this social network; 
illegally accessed another person’s email account and violated the person’s privacy by various subsequent 
actions; changed the assessment results of the student’s knowledge after gaining access to the electronic diary 
of studies. These are just some of the examples which show that illegal access to an IS can lead to other, no less 
significant violations of legal values. 
On the other hand, it should be admitted that from the legal perspective there can also be less dangerous 
situations of illegal access to an IS. For example, when a detected single-time access to an IS has not caused 
any real damage to the security measures of the system and, according to the case-file data, it is obvious that 
the offender did not intend to engage in any illegal actions in this system; no supplementary tools have been 
used for the access; the IS security gaps have not been created by the person himself; access data have not been 
gained by purchasing or using malicious software, etc. It follows that some cases of illegal access to an IS will 
make it necessary to speak about the risk of over-criminalisation of this criminal offence. Any discussion of 
over-criminalisation, not excluding cybercrime, must start ‘from a conception of the mean, of the right amount 
of criminal law’ (Ashworth, 2008: pp. 407–425). The principle of criminal liability as a measure of last resort 
(ultima ratio), first of all, sets rational requirements for the legislator and the user of law to be followed when 
recognising certain acts as criminal – along with really dangerous conduct, a rather abstractly formulated rule 
is likely to include also the acts of doubtful dangerousness. For example, the requirements which derive from 
the ultima ratio principle have been linked in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania with, 
inter alia, the constitutional principles of proportionality and reasonableness: ‘When setting legal restrictions 
and liability for violations of law, one must pay heed to the requirement of reasonableness and the principle of 
proportionality, according to which the established legal measures should be necessary in a democratic society 
and suitable for achieving legitimate and universally important objectives (there must be a balance between 
the objectives and measures), they may not restrict the rights of the person more than it is necessary in order 
to achieve the said objectives’ (Ruling of 16 January 2006 of the Constitutional Court Ruling of the Republic 
of Lithuania). Just as important is the approach established in the case law of this Court that ‘<...> under the 
Constitution, the legislature may specify, by means of a criminal law, only those acts as crimes which are 
really dangerous and which inflict or can lead to considerable damage to the interests of persons, society and 
those of the state’ (Ruling of 10 June 2003 of the Constitutional Court Ruling of the Republic of Lithuania), 
‘not only repressive but also preventive measures are applied when restricting and reducing crime’ (Ruling 
of 29 December 2004 of the Constitutional Court Ruling of the Republic of Lithuania), ‘it is not permitted to 
establish the punishments for criminal acts and their sizes which would be obviously inadequate to the criminal 
act and the purpose of the punishment’ (Ruling of 8 June 2009 of the Constitutional Court Ruling of the 
Republic of Lithuania). In the context of these provisions in terms of illegal access to an IS, support should be 
expressed to the idea that ‘efficient security measures could protect information systems much more efficiently 
than unrestrained criminalization’ (Kaiafa-Gbandi, 2012: p. 59–79). 
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The idea of criminal liability as ultima ratio is also in some aspects reflected in the above-mentioned Convention 
and Directive 2013/40/EU. For example, paragraph 11 of the Preamble of Directive 2013/40/EU states that 
‘[t]his Directive provides for criminal penalties at least for cases which are not minor’. Paragraph 49 of the 
Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime also notes that ‘the broad approach of criminalisation 
in the first sentence of Article 2 is not undisputed. Opposition stems from situations where no dangers were 
created by the mere intrusion or where even acts of hacking have led to the detection of loopholes and 
weaknesses of the security of systems. This has led in a range of countries to a narrower approach requiring 
additional qualifying circumstances <…>.’ It is also relevant that the need to avoid over-criminalisation, 
particularly of minor cases, has been emphasised in paragraph 13 of the Preamble of Council Framework 
Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems (Decision 2005/222/
JHA). Therefore, to prevent unjustified application of criminal liability, the elements of illegality of access 
and intent in the construction of corpus delicti of illegal access to an IS in national legislation are necessary, 
however, inadequate to render a person criminally liable. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
Decision 2005/222/JHA and Directive 2013/40/EU, the ‘breadth’ of this criminal offence may be narrowed 
by additional circumstances that can indicate a higher dangerousness of an offence. For example, Article 2 
of the Convention sets out several such alternatives, i.e. in order to incriminate illegal access to an IS, it may 
be required that this act is committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer 
data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer 
system. Decision 2005/222/JHA and Directive 2013/40/EU provide for fewer circumstances in this regard 
and, accordingly, narrower possibilities in constructing the corpus delicti of illegal access to an IS in the 
national law. Article 2 of Decision 2005/222/JHA notes that each Member State may decide that illegal access 
to an IS should be incriminated only where the offence is committed by infringing a security measure. A 
similar, although not identical, approach is laid down in Article 3 of Directive 2013/40/EU where it is stated 
that Member States shall take measures to ensure that illegal access to IS is punishable as a criminal offence 
where committed by infringing a security measure, at least for cases which are not minor. As can be seen, 
these circumstances allow limits to be set for criminalising illegal access to an IS and may be considered to be 
rational requirements in recognising this offence as criminal. 
Thus, depending on the chosen concept of illegal access to an IS, different ways of combining the elements of 
this offence and different options for solving over-criminalisation of this offence may be chosen in national 
laws. The varying approach to illegal access to an IS not only shows difficulties in comparing this offence, but 
also indicates that certain issues of qualification (considering descriptions of the elements of this offence) are 
likely only in certain rather than in all states. For example, criminal liability may be provided for illegal access 
to data rather than an IS, if there has been illegal interference with security measures or a system. In other 
cases, illegal access to IS is criminalised by also referring to other circumstances evidencing the dangerousness 
of this offence along with the elements of unlawfulness and gaining of access. This distinction is important as 
it allows to decide whether it is, first of all, an interference with the confidentiality of electronic data or an IS 
that is pivotal in this criminal offence. Thus, in the first case, the focus is on the defendant’s interaction with 
electronic data rather than with an IS. In the second case, in contrast, the focus is on ascertaining that the access 
to an IS has been unauthorised (Clough, 2010: p. 72). The latter approach to the offence of illegal access to an 
IS has been implemented in the Lithuanian Criminal Code (CC) – its Article 1981 provides for criminal liability 
for illegal access to an IS by infringing the security measures of the system.
3. Lithuanian approach and case law interpreting illegal access to an IS 
The Lithuanian CC currently contains a whole set of provisions applicable with regard to cybercrime. For 
example, the criminal offences which directly violate the security of electronic data and an IS have been 
criminalised separately, in Chapter XXX of the CC (It criminalises offences such as illegal data interference 
(Article 196), illegal system interference (Article 197), unlawful interception and use of electronic data 
(Article 198), illegal access to an information system (Article 1981), unlawful disposal of installations, 
software, passwords, login codes, codes and other data (Article 1982). These offences correspond to the offences 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems specified in the Convention, 
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as well as the criminal offences indicated in Articles 2–4 of Decision 2005/222/JHA and Articles 3–7 of 
Directive 2013/40/EU. Meanwhile traditional criminal offences, which have undergone changes as a result of 
the use of information and communication technologies (computer-related fraud, forgery, offences related to 
child pornography, libel, etc.), are qualified according to the same Articles of the CC as those providing for 
traditional criminal offences. For example, the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania invokes a broad 
interpretation of ‘a document’ in the criminal cases of this category, which allows applying Article 300 of the 
CC also in cases when an electronic document is forged: ‘The Law does not specify any requirements for the 
form of a document. A document may mean any record made in any form on paper, in the electronic space or 
in a computer medium, however, there are requirements set for the content of a document. A document should 
provide information about an event, action or person. A document means a record made in any form, which 
establishes, modifies or revokes a legally relevant fact (legal fact). It means a record the use whereof can lead 
to the effects of legal significance for a natural person, legal entity or the State’ (ruling of 11 February 2014 
of the Criminal Cases Division of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, civil case No. 2K-57/2014). Such 
approach is predetermined by the fact that these CC provisions are drafted as technology neutral; likewise, the 
requirements deriving from the principle of equivalence are also relevant for such interpretation (Fedosiuk & 
Marcinauskaitė, 2013: p. 8).
Thus, criminal liability for the offence of illegal access to an IS is established in Article 1981 of the CC in 
Lithuania and its definition has been narrowed in one of the ways referred to in Article 2 of the Convention, 
Article 2 of Decision 2005/222/JHA and Article 3 of Directive 2013/40/EU. That is, with the view of preventing 
the criminalisation of offences which are clearly harmless, incrimination of illegal access to an IS under 
Lithuanian national law requires proof not only of unauthorised access to an IS and intentional guilt, but also 
of the fact that such access has been gained by infringing security measures. This description of the criminal 
offence elements means that illegal access to an IS has been criminalised as an individual criminal offence 
without linking it with subsequent acts of the offender in the system. The most recent amendments of this 
Article of the CC (2015) are related to the implementation of provisions of Article 3 of Directive 2013/40/EU in 
the national law. It should be noted, however, that the implementation of the Directive did not radically reform 
illegal access to an IS: amendments have revised the subject-matter of the criminal offence – not only an IS but 
also part of it has been included in its corpus delicti, thus, access to an IS is considered criminal when access 
has been gained both to the whole IS and to its part; the penalty provided for this criminal offence has also been 
made more stringent. 
The need to revise the subject-matter of this criminal offence has, in fact, derived not only as a result of 
provisions of Article 3 of Directive 2013/40/EU but also due to the definition issues of an IS and its functioning 
specifics. To implement the principle of technological neutrality, Article 2(a) of Directive 2013/40/EU gives 
an abstract definition of an IS: ‘a device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, 
pursuant to a program, automatically processes computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, 
retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or their operation, use, 
protection and maintenance.’ Such ‘technological neutrality’ of this concept, on the one hand, helps ensure 
the openness of the elements to the developments in cyberspace, and, on the other hand, causes difficulties in 
deciding what is an IS and what it is not. As can be seen, the concept of IS is constructed by reference to devices 
or groups of inter-connected devices that constitute such systems. It is obvious that an IS normally functions 
as a unit consisting of different combinations of components. The complexity and integration process of IS can 
be described as follow: ‘the small elements of the systems or small systems are integrated into larger systems 
which increases the system complexity and creates conditions for vulnerabilities to arise not only in domestic 
but also in countries interconnected systems’ (Limba, et al, 2017: p. 560). It follows from these considerations 
that illegal interference with the confidentiality of an IS is possible not only by directly impacting the entire 
system but also by targeting only its specific components (parts of IS) that perform specific functions. This can 
cause uncertainties in the area of criminal law – is it possible to state the fact of access to the entire IS if access 
has been gained only to any of its devices? In this regard it is important that the notions of confidentiality, 
availability and integrity apply not only to electronic data but also to other network resources, external devices 
or accessories. There is a multitude of system resources, which, if used illegally, can facilitate infringements of 
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IS security. It is also relevant that ‘each component of the information system has its own security requirements’ 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2009: p. 14). Therefore, in order to avoid potential misunderstandings in interpreting 
the elements of the subject-matter provided for in Article 1981 of the CC, the above-referred amendments have 
resolved the issue of incrimination of illegal access to an IS in case the situation as discussed is discovered 
in criminal proceedings (for example, an offender logs into an external device, some network infrastructure 
devices, etc.). 
Imposition of criminal liability only for illegal access to an IS as such also implies other questions, for example, 
not only what, but also how many criminal offences have been committed by an offender. The mechanism 
of commission of cybercrime shows that an offender’s actions are normally not limited only to unauthorised 
access to an IS – intrusion into a system is also followed up by other criminal offences, which can infringe 
the confidentiality, integrity, availability of an IS or electronic data, or other values protected by criminal law. 
Attacks against an IS can be different, however, where an offender gains unauthorised access to an IS, such 
act of cybertrespass ‘can lead to unauthorized real or virtual action that enable information gatherers to enter 
premises or systems they have not been authorized to enter’ (Whitman & Mattord, 2009: p. 46). It is, therefore, 
obvious that the offender gets the opportunity to carry out subsequent criminal offences as a result of his initial 
unauthorised access actions. Thus, when assessing criminal offences from the perspective of criminal law in 
such cases, very frequent incrimination of illegal access to an IS in cybercrime cases should not be surprising – 
other criminal offences committed in that same system do not cover unauthorised access to IS according to the 
provisions of the Lithuanian CC. 
For example, one of the stages of cyber fraud can be related to infringements of the confidentiality of the IS 
of a bank, i.e. in the case of the illegal use of the lawful user’s data, which are necessary for his authentication 
and authorisation and by which he logs in and is recognised in the electronic banking system (for example, 
in an electronic banking system, a user may be authenticated and get authorisation in one of the following 
ways – according to the user ID, permanent password and one of the codes indicated in the identification code 
card or according to the user ID and a one-off identification code generated by a code generator). Internet 
banking in this context can be defined as ‘providing banking products and services via computer network (the 
Internet)’ (Belás, et al, 2016: p. 412). Offenders usually obtain credit card data, online banking logins, and 
other sensitive financial information using different methods – phishing, pharming, using malicious software, 
buying stolen financial information, etc. (Bryan, et al, 2009: pp. 21-68). For example, Zang (2017: pp. 98–99) 
points out that unauthorized-information-related services (inter alia the retail of financial data such as bank 
account details) are considered as provisions of technical assistance to commit cybercrimes. ‘Criminals see 
the card industry as a lucrative business that can be exploited by the use of technology’ (Korauš, et al., 2017: 
p. 571; Korauš, et al, 2019). 
Although the stage of accessing e-banking by means of illegally obtained sensitive data is often intermediary 
in case of fraud, it is normally necessary when the offender seeks illegal payment transactions in the e-banking 
system by subsequent actions. The possibility of treating such access after infringing the security measures of 
a banking system as illegal access to an IS has been pointed out, for example, in the ruling of 26 June 2012 
of the Chamber of Judges of the Criminal Cases Division of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case 
No. 2K-375/2012. It has been noted in the ruling that the offender’s ‘illegal access to the internet banking 
system by using the identifying details of another person could be also qualified under Article 1981 of the CC as 
illegal access to an information system by infringing its security measures.’ Thus, according to the Lithuanian 
CC, depending on the mechanism chosen to commit cyber fraud, all four articles of the CC may be applied 
for qualifying fraud in the electronic banking system (Illegal Access to an Information System (Article 1981), 
Production of a Counterfeit Electronic Means of Payment, Forgery of a Genuine Electronic Means of Payment 
or Unlawful Possession of an Electronic Means of Payment or Data Thereof (Article 214), Unlawful Use of an 
Electronic Means of Payment or Data Thereof (Article 215), Swindling (Article 182).
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3.1. Addressing the issues of over-criminalisation of illegal access to an IS in the Lithuanian case law
The idea of the ultima ratio principle is explored not only in the doctrine of criminal law but is also developed 
in the case law in Lithuania. It is interesting to note in this regard that recently efforts have been made to 
formulate specific criteria which would allow avoiding formal assessment of criminal offences and convictions 
for acts the dangerousness whereof is, in principle, doubtful in criminal cases concerning illegal access to an IS.
As mentioned, the method of illegal access to an IS, i.e. an infringement of the security measures of the system, 
is one of the criteria defining the scope of incrimination of illegal access to an IS. According to Article 3 of 
Directive 2013/40/EU, an infringement of a security measure is necessary for incriminating the elements of 
this criminal offence, however, as stated in that same Article, at least for cases which are not minor. Although 
the Directive itself does not clarify the content of a minor case, leaving this issue to the discretion of national 
law and case law, paragraph 11 of the Preamble of the Directive point to certain criteria, which are important 
for an assessment: ‘A case may be considered minor, for example, where the damage caused by the offence 
and/or the risk to public or private interests, such as to the integrity of a computer system or to computer data, 
or to the integrity, rights or other interests of a person, is insignificant or is of such a nature that the imposition 
of a criminal penalty within the legal threshold or the imposition of criminal liability is not necessary.’ The 
specification of these rather abstract provisions is, undoubtedly, within the remit of case law – it is clarified in 
each criminal case whether a detected illegal access to an IS is really dangerous and the criteria for substantiating 
the dangerousness of such offence are also explored. 
In one such case, the Supreme Court of Lithuania had to decide whether an offender had been validly acquitted 
as the person who had not committed the offence of illegal access to an IS as provided for in Article 1981 of the 
CC. It was ascertained in this case that the person, using a computer and access to the internet, had twelve times 
illegally accessed the electronic banking system by infringing the security measures of that system. Using the 
illegally obtained data to log into the electronic banking system (the identification code of the e-banking user, 
the personal login password, the passwords given by the bank for accessing the e-banking), he misled the IS, 
which identified him as a lawful user of the system. That enabled him to initiate financial transactions illegally 
and acquire another person’s assets for his own benefit by deceit. The Supreme Court of Lithuania has stated 
in the ruling handed down in this case (ruling of 26 January 2016 in criminal case No. 2K-4-507/2016) that 
‘the offence has to be qualified under Article 1981 of the CC if it is ascertained that an information system has 
been accessed by infringing the security measures of the system. In interpreting the element of infringement of 
security measures of an information system, it has been noted in the cassation rulings that: (1) the authentication 
verification procedure making it possible to identify a user in an information system may be considered to be 
one of the security measures of the system <…>, (2) illegal entering of the data to identifying a lawful user 
thereby misleading the system should be considered to be an infringement of the security measures of the 
system, and (3) unauthorised access to an information system (internet banking system) by infringing the 
restrictions (requirements), which have been set by authentication measures for logging into the information 
system, normally may not be held to be a minor case from the perspective of criminal law, in particular if that 
made it possible to commit other illegal actions in the system <...>’. This interpretation is important because the 
court has formulated one of the possible criteria for assessing the dangerousness of the offence of illegal access 
to an IS, i.e. an illegal access normally may not be held to be a minor case, if it has facilitated the commission 
of other criminal offences in the system (in the above-referred case, cyber fraud). Such follow-up offences 
committed by an offender after logging into an electronic banking system also show a more extensive scope of 
violations of the victim’s legitimate interests, thus, also the necessity to apply criminal liability. In the light of 
these considerations, the court has held that the judgment of acquittal in the case at issue was unfounded and 
that the illegal access to the IS had been sufficiently dangerous to be punished by the instruments of criminal 
law. As is known, one of the functions of criminal law is ‘to express the degree of wrongdoing, not simply the 
fact of wrongdoing’ (Ashworth, 2003: p. 37). It may be held that the above-discussed possibility of assessing 
the dangerousness of illegal access to an IS would be consistent with such approach to criminal law.  
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3.2. Issues of interpretation of infringement of IS security measures according to Lithuanian case law
The main problem in delimiting legal and illegal access to IS is mostly related to the possibilities of 
distinguishing between private and public spaces, hence, also with the boundaries facilitating such distinction 
in the cyberspace. According to Walden (2007: p. 163), ‘many of the problems discerning authorization in 
cyberspace arise, in part, from the manner in which the Internet challenges and disrupts traditional concepts 
of the public and private spheres’. The fundamental philosophy of communication in the electronic space is 
that ‘a resource whose URL is known should be accessible from any connected computer unless its controller 
has taken technical steps to make it inaccessible’ (Reed, 2004: 66). Such attitude to the separation of public 
and private spaces may indicate not only legal but also certain technical barriers, which partly define the 
boundaries of the private cyberspace. A method for identifying such boundaries is different from the one used 
in the physical space. For example, Lessig sets constraints on the actions allowed in the cyberspace by the 
architecture of that space based on a computer code. The author notes that ‘the software and hardware that 
make cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can behave’ (Lessig, 1999: p. 89). The 
content of such technological restrictions can be different in each case, but they set the conditions of authorised 
access to the private cyberspace. It follows that different restrictions set for accessing an IS show the measures 
taken to ensure the confidentiality of the system and express the attitude of its owner or lawful manager to the 
possibilities of and conditions for accessing the system: ‘These boundaries give notice to trespassers that they 
are encroaching on the organization’s cyberspace’ (Whitman & Mattord, 2009: p. 46). It should be noted that 
the application of different restrictions on the access to an IS is most of all predetermined by the requirements 
of system security as defined by a security policy (for example, who and in what conditions is given access 
to an IS). Accordingly, disregard of such restrictions points to unauthorised access to an IS, thus, also to the 
infringements of confidentiality of such system. 
 
From the perspective of criminal law, one of the ways of disregarding IS security measures is relevant in this 
context – unauthorised access ‘bypassing code-based restrictions on access’ (Wong, 2006: p. 124). One of the 
major technological and terminological problems in this area may be expressed by the question – should it be 
stated that an infringement of security measures has been committed only when damage has been caused to 
security measures; or should this way of committing a criminal offence also be interpreted as circumvention of 
the restrictions (requirements) imposed by security measures. It is most evident that no damage is inflicted on 
IS security measures as such when an offender infringes the restrictions on accessing an IS set by authentication 
and authorisation measures (for example, logs into an email account, social networks, internet banking, online 
store using another person’s data). Admittedly, ‘sound principles of authentication and authorization can help 
organizations protect valuable information and systems. These control methods and technologies employ multiple 
layers or factors to protect against unauthorized access’ (Whitman & Mattord, 2009: p. 46). However, whether 
or not the circumvention of such security measures should be treated as infringement of security measures 
in terms of criminal law and whether the offence should be qualified as illegal access to an IS can be highly 
debatable. In particular, considering the risks of over-criminalisation of such offence, as mentioned above.
Although illegal access to an IS has always been linked with an infringement of system security measures 
in Article 1981 of the Lithuanian CC, it is only in recent years that the case law on interpreting this element 
began taking shape. The recent developments in the case law in the criminal cases of this category indicate 
that infringement of security measures should be interpreted not only as the infliction of damage on security 
measures but also as the circumvention of the restrictions (requirements) imposed by such measures without 
any damage to the security measures as such. Infringement of security measures in such cases is linked with 
breaches of identity verification procedures, hence, also with IS fraud. This interpretation, although indirectly, 
may be inferred from the ruling of 9 October 2001 of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-
682/2001 where it has been held that ‘all transactions with monetary funds in the electronic banking are managed 
on the basis of man-made computer programs. A customer communicates with the bank not directly but via 
the electronic system. The system has been designed so as to receive a command and carry out a transaction if 
correct identification codes of account holders have been entered. It is specifically the code that, according to 
principles of operation of the program, identifies the person as the account holder and verifies the authorisation 
340
JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES
ISSN 2029-7017 print/ISSN 2029-7025 online
to carry out transactions with the money held in the account. If the code is entered and the command is given 
by the person without authorisation to carry out transactions with the money held in the account, he presents 
himself as another person who has such authorisation to the operational system or to the bank and thereby 
misleads the electronic system and also the bank. The latter, erroneously holding that the command given 
by such a person is legal, under the impact of error transfers the title to the assets, i.e. transfers the money to 
another account holder and later disburses the money.’ Although such interpretation has been formulated in the 
criminal proceedings of cyber fraud in relation to deceit, as one of the elements of this criminal offence, the 
court has obviously admitted that not only a natural person but also an IS can be misled. If such interpretation 
were applied to illegal access to an IS in criminal proceedings, it would be possible to state that, by logging into 
an IS by means of the data held by another person, the offender presents himself to the IS as its authorised user 
and in this way, by deceit, circumvents the security measures of the system. The emergence of this new type 
of deceit has been facilitated by the specifics inherent in the proof of identity itself on the electronic space: ‘In 
network technologies, physical proof (such as a driver‘s license or other photo ID) cannot be employed, so you 
have to get something else from the user’ (Network and system security, 2010: p. 77).
   
It is also relevant that an authentication procedure, as one of the IS security measures, applies not only in 
electronic banking but also in other systems which provide various electronic services (online stores, email, 
social networks, internet auctions, etc.). Therefore, if it is identified that these systems have also been accessed 
without authorisation (through illegal use of the login data of a lawful user), the offender’s conduct should be 
considered as illegal access to an IS. For example, the Supreme Court of Lithuania has held in one of the cases 
heard in 2015 that there had been unauthorised access to an email account, which allowed the offender to read 
the correspondence of private persons. The court has reiterated in this case that ‘the authentication verification 
procedure making it possible to identify a user in the e-mail system may be considered one of the security 
measures of the system (as well as confidentiality). While illegal entering of the details of proof a lawful user’s 
identity thereby misleading the system should be considered to be an infringement of the security measures of 
the system, and <...> is equivalent to the method in which the offences of unlawful access to an IS is committed’ 
(ruling of 6 January 2015 of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal case No. 2K-138/2015). However, as 
previously mentioned, in implementing the idea of ultima ratio in criminal law, it should also be assessed in 
such situations whether the offence committed is sufficiently dangerous. 
4. Conclusions
Creation of the legal grounds for criminal liability for illegal access to an IS has not provided a final solution 
to the issue of over-criminalisation of this criminal act. This is particularly true in cases where this criminal 
offence is criminalised as dangerous in itself (per se), i.e. without linking it with further criminal actions of the 
offender in the system. The provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime and Directive 2013/40/EU offer one 
solution to this problem – to link the hacking offence with the element of infringement of a security measure. 
It should be admitted, however, that the presence of this circumstance does not always facilitate a sufficient 
degree of proof on the dangerousness of the criminal offence committed. The definition of illegal access of 
an IS in Article 3 of Directive 2013/40/EU treats this element as necessary, however, the provision as such 
indicates the need to identify whether such cases of illegal access are not minor cases. 
This problem partly derives from the interpretation of the element – infringement of a security measure. The 
analysis shows that the above-referred element could be interpreted not only as the infliction of damage on 
security measures but also as the circumvention of the restrictions set by such measures or as deceit leading to no 
damage to the security measures as such. Such approach is relevant as it also allows speaking about other, no less 
dangerous cases of accessing an IS, which do not cause any direct damage to the functioning of security measures.
Whereas decisions on the issue of minor importance as far as illegal access to IS is concerned has been retained 
for the national case law, it is highly important to find appropriate criteria for substantiating the dangerousness 
of the offence of hacking. Therefore, where no direct damage to IS security measures is discovered in criminal 
proceedings, the apparent dangerousness of illegal access to an IS may be inferred from the fact that the 
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offender intended or has committed other criminal offences in the system after gaining the access; that the data 
necessary to access the IS has been obtained illegally (purchased, obtained using malicious software, etc.); 
that IS security gaps have been created and used at a later stage; that the IS has been accessed using additional 
means and instruments, etc.
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